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ABSTRACT 
Questions have been raised regarding the role of low-tax offshore jurisdictions in the 
global financial crisis, based largely on evidence that many problematic asset-backed securities 
were issued from or listed in the Cayman Islands, Jersey, Ireland, and other ‘offshore’ sites.  
However, there has not been a systematic investigation of the offshore geography of crisis-
implicated securitization.  Here we fill this gap by constructing the first comprehensive 
jurisdictional map of the largest pre-crisis Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) programs, 
and examining the rationale for and impacts of this geography in detail.  We show that offshore 
jurisdictions were disproportionately involved in producing the most unstable ABCP classes.  
However, this is difficult to explain in terms of the traditional role of offshore banking centers as 
sites for direct avoidance of onshore regulation and transparency.  Rather, we propose a 
Minskian model of pre-crisis offshore ABCP production, wherein these jurisdictions specialized 
in alleviating incidental institutional frictions (e.g. double taxation) hindering onshore financial 
innovation.  In this context, they could sometimes be legitimately described as improving the 
institutional ‘efficiency’ of financial markets; however, by facilitating the endogenous 
evolutionary instability of these markets, this apparently innocuous service had profoundly 
negative effects.  This normative disconnect poses a conundrum for offshore reform. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: OFFSHORE JURISDICTIONS AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
While a wide diversity of views exists as to the causes of the 2007-2009 global financial 
crisis, these causes have tended to be theorized within relatively narrow geographic parameters.  
This theorization has generally emphasized some combination of globally and nationally-framed 
processes, whether regulatory, macroeconomic, or political in nature.  Meanwhile, the financial 
centers where crisis-implicated activities were conducted have received relatively little scholarly 
attention.  This omission not only contrasts with an emphasis in public discourse on the role of 
‘Wall Street’ or ‘The City’ in the crisis, but overlooks a long tradition of financial geographic 
research on the role of financial centers in the world economy.  As this has underscored, 
financial centers are not simply incidental sites of financial actor residence, but play a key role in 
shaping the informational, cultural, and political milieus which condition the conduct and 
evolution of financial activity.
1
 As such, it is only by directly addressing their role that the 
production of financial crises can be effectively analyzed.
2
  
The global financial crisis unfolded as a collapse of the shadow banking system, wherein 
traditional bank lending and deposit-taking were simulated through the production, purchase and 
trading of securities.
3
  It is possible to identify two categories of financial center involved in 
these activities.
4
  The first were the ‘world cities’ that served as sites for their functional 
coordination.  In the context of shadow banking, the agglomeration of financial professionals and 
firms in these cities facilitated not only the flow of information within markets, but also 
innovation in the securitization ‘knowledge industry.’  Sitting at the apex of this world city 
network was the Wall Street-City ‘NY-LON axis,’5 which occupied a dominant global position 
in securities issuance, trading, and development. 
The role of the second category of financial center involved in crisis-implicated shadow 
banking activities is more poorly understood.  These were the offshore jurisdictions hosting the 
                                                          
1
 See Johnathon V Beaverstock, Richard G Smith and Peter J Taylor, ‘World City Network: A New 
Metageography?’ (2000) 90 Annals of the Association of American Geographers 123; Peter J Taylor, Gilda Catalana 
and David Walker, ‘Multiple Globalisations: Regional, Hierarchical and Sectoral Articulations of Global Business 
Services through World Cities’ (2004) 24 Service Industries Journal 63; Nigel Thrift, ‘On the Social and Cultural 
Determinants of International Financial Centres: The Case of the City of London’ in R Martin, N Thrift and S 
Corbridge (eds), Money, power and space (Blackwell 1994) 327–355;. 
2
 See Ronald Martin, ‘The Local Geographies of the Financial Crisis: From the Housing Bubble to Economic 
Recession and Beyond’ (2011) 11(4) Journal of Economic Geography 587; Dariusz Wójcik, ‘The Dark Side of NY-
LON: Financial Centres and the Global Financial Crisis’ (2013) 50(13) Urban Studies 2736. 
3
 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States (U.S. Government Printing 
Office 2011); Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, ‘Regulating the Shadow Banking System’ (2010) Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 261; Zoltan Pozsar, Z., Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, Haley Boesky, Shadow 
Banking (2010, revised 2012) Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports No 458;. 
4
 See framework in Neil M Coe, Karen P Y Lai and Dariusz Wójcik, ‘Integrating Finance into Global Production 
Networks (2014) 48 Regional Studies 761; Wójcik (n 2) 2736; Dariusz Wójcik, ‘Where Governance Fails: 
Advanced Business Services and the Offshore World’ (2013) 37 Progress in Human Geography 330. 
5
 Wójcik (n 2) 2736 
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formal legal vehicles that constituted the ‘paper’ geography of the shadow banking sector.6  It is 
known that securitization special purpose vehicles (SPVs) domiciled in low-tax, ‘light-touch’ 
regulation jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands, Jersey, and Ireland, were linked to some of 
the most high-profile bank failures in the global financial crisis.
7
  Furthermore, several critical 
accounts of the offshore world have argued that these jurisdictions were partially to blame for the 
crisis in a fairly direct sense.
8
  However, analyses of the role of offshore jurisdictions as 
securitization SPV hosts, or sites for structured finance securities listing (e.g. Ireland
9
), have 
struggled to draw a concrete connection between the governance of these activities and their 
geographic domicile, as opposed to simply existence.
10
   
At most, analyses have implicated the geography of shadow banking securitization 
vehicles and securities exchange listings in the undermining of relatively peripheral points of 
European securities regulation.
11
  This is difficult to square with both the status of the United 
States as the homeland of the subprime crisis and shadow banking, and the more fundamental 
importance of prudential regulatory failure in this context.  More commonly, issues of tax 
efficiency have been cited as primary motivations for the offshore location of securitization 
                                                          
6
 For a discussion of the role of offshore jurisdictions / tax havens as securitization vehicle hosts, in relation to the 
coordinating role of major global financial centers see Thomas Wainwright, ‘Tax Doesn’t Have to be Taxing: 
London’s “Onshore” Finance Industry and the Fiscal Spaces of a Global Crisis’ (2011) 43(6) Environment and 
Planning A 1287; Wójcik (n 4) 330. 
7
 The failure of Northern Rock, for example, has been linked to a funding vehicle in Jersey; likewise, the failure of 
Sachsen LB was precipitated by the failure of a similar vehicle in Ireland, where a large number of collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs were also known have been exchange-listed.  In perhaps the most notorious incident of the 
crisis, the failure of German IKB partially resulted from its purchase, via a Jersey-based vehicle, of a Goldman 
Sachs-underwritten CDO issued in the Caymans.  See Ronen Palan, Richard Murphy and Christian Chavgneux, Tax 
havens: How globalization really works (Cornell University Press 2010); Nicholas Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Tax 
Havens and the Men who Stole the World (Vintage 2011); Jim Stewart, ‘Low tax Financial Centres and the Financial 
Crisis: The Case of the Irish Financial Services Centre’ (2013) IIIS Discussion Paper No. 420 
<http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/documents/discussion/pdfs/iiisdp420.pdf> accessed November 2016. 
8
 See Shaxson (n 7) and Stewart (n 7). According to Shaxson (n 7) 192, ‘financial markets seized up in 2007 because 
nobody knew, or trusted, what the other players in the market were doing, or what they were worth, or what or 
where their risks were.  And there is nothing – nothing – like the offshore system to generate opacity.’ Beyond this, 
‘the global offshore system…provided financial corporations with a “get out of regulation free card”’ Shaxson (n7) 
29. 
9
 see Stewart 2013 (n 7) 
10
 In their examination of the ‘black holes’ of the global financial system, for example, Palan and Nesvetailova 
discuss offshore banking and shadow banking, but do not draw a direct connection between the two.  See Ronen 
Palan and Anastasia Nesvetailova, (2013) ‘The Governance of the Black Holes of the World Economy: Shadow 
Banking and Offshore Finance’ (2013) City Political Economy Research Centre (CITYPERC) Report No. 2013-03 
< http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/2113/1/CITYPERC-WPS-2013_03.pdf> accessed November 9 2016.  A particularly 
thorny issue is the definition and significance of ‘offshore’ itself in the context of shadow banking, given the 
apparently key role of US states (e.g. Delaware) falling within Federal regulatory jurisdiction.  See Palan et al. (n 7) 
161-169 and Shaxson (n 7) 166-192.   
11
 Stewart (n 7); Bayer, K. M., and Bräutigam, L. 2015. ‘Shadow Banking and the Offshore Nexus – Some 
Considerations on the Systemic Linkages of Two Important Economic Phenomena’ (2015) ICAE Working Paper 
Series No. 40 <https://www.jku.at/icae/content/e248904/e248907/e249185/e289414/wp40.pdf> accessed November 
9 2016. 
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vehicles.
12
  However, the relationship between taxation and financial stability has not been 
clearly theorized in this context, with the rather innocuous device of ‘tax neutrality’ sometimes 
being squeezed into offshore financial conceptual frameworks built around the idea of overtly 
harmful secrecy and regulatory laxity.  None of this literature has situated offshore jurisdictions 
within the type of ground-up analysis of international shadow banking organization and 
regulation necessary for their significance to be contextualized.  Most problematically, we do not 
have the detailed empirical picture of the scale and organization of offshore shadow banking that 
would allow for these questions to be systematically tackled.
13
  Ultimately, as noted by Palan et 
al. (n 7) 165, ‘why so many SPVs were set up in tax havens is not entirely clear…nor is it clear 
what proportion of the structured finance market was set up offshore.’   
In this paper, we seek to fill these gaps in the literature on offshore shadow banking by 1) 
compiling data from an array of archival sources (e.g. company registries, ratings agency reports, 
offering prospectuses) to construct the first detailed map of the jurisdictional geography of pre-
crisis shadow banking, and 2) systematically analyzing the relevant academic, regulator and 
practitioner (e.g. legal specialist) literature on the taxation and regulation of these activities to 
determine the potential direct and indirect bearing of their jurisdictional geography on financial 
stability.  Specifically, we focus on the production of the short-term Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper (ABCP) which constituted one of the key outputs of the subprime mortgage-backed 
security assembly line from the standpoint of shadow-banking maturity and liquidity 
transformation.  Prior to the global financial crisis, ABCP was seen as one of the least 
adventurous classes of debt instrument.  However, the ABCP market ultimately proved to be 
surprisingly unstable, and played a central role in the run on the shadow-banking system that 
began in mid-2007.  Most importantly, from the standpoint of the study here, many of the 
vehicles that issued ABCP are known, at an anecdotal level, to have been located in so-called 
‘small island’ offshore jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands.   
The evidence we present fully confirms these anecdotal reports.  In fact, we show that the 
structured investment vehicles (SIVs), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and credit 
arbitrage conduits issuing the most problematic forms of ABCP were disproportionately 
concentrated in ‘small islands,’ whereas more stable issuers were mostly based in ‘onshore-
offshore’ Delaware.  However, we find that this geography is difficult to explain in terms of the 
traditional conceptualization of offshore banking centers, wherein they are seen as sites for the 
direct escape of the jurisdiction of onshore authorities.  The substantive onshore regulation of 
these activities (most importantly by the US) was so minimal that there was very little to escape 
from; furthermore, what little regulation there was had increasingly assumed an extra-
territorialized form, by the onset of the global financial crisis, that projected onshore authority 
                                                          
12
 See Bayer and Brautigam (n 11); Gary B Gorton and Nicholas S Souleles, ‘Special Purpose Vehicles and 
Securitization’ In M Carey and R M Stulz (eds) The Risks of Financial Institutions (University of Chicago Press 
2007) 546-602 
<http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9619.pdf> accessed November 9 2016; Wainwright (n 6) 1287.   
13
 As noted by Bayer and Brautigam (n 11).   
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offshore.  This reflected a broader multi-decadal pattern of state political geographic adaption to 
globalization.  Given this two-pronged narrowing of their significance as sites for overt 
regulatory avoidance, we argue that offshore jurisdictions had, in this context, increasingly 
moved into a more complex normative grey area, wherein their specialization was less in the 
provision of overt forms of secrecy and regulatory laxity, than a flexible political environment 
that facilitated rapid institutional innovation.  This innovation could sometimes be legitimately 
described, at least in a narrow sense, as improving the institutional ‘efficiency’ of global 
financial markets; however, given the endogenous crisis-generating logic of markets described 
by Keynes and Minsky, this apparently innocuous behavior could also have profoundly negative 
systematic consequences.  More than pointing the finger of blame at offshore jurisdictions per se, 
this underscores a fundamental conundrum in financial governance.   
 The remainder of the paper is divided in four sections.  In section two, we conceptually 
problematize the logic of offshore shadow banking, and situate it within a Minskian model of 
offshore financial institutional innovation.  Next, in section three, we provide an overview of the 
organization of ABCP production on the eve of the global financial crisis, before revealing its 
detailed jurisdictional geography.  In section four, we seek to understand the significance of and 
rationale for these jurisdictional structures, through a combination of a process-of-elimination 
analysis of relevant onshore regulations—wherein we rule out the potential significance of most 
forms of direct offshore regulatory arbitrage—and a review of the relevant practitioner literature, 
which indicates that the hosting of these activities offshore was primarily motivated by more 
subtle and innocuous factors such as tax neutrality, speed of entity creation, and bankruptcy 
resolution law.  Finally, in the conclusion, we examine the policy implications of these findings.  
Specifically, we suggest that certain types of institutional ‘inefficiency’ may need to be explicitly 
recognized and protected as a ‘Minskian Tobin Tax’ on financial innovation and complexity.   
 
2. FROM ‘BLACK HOLES’ TO ‘BALL BEARINGS’: A MINSKIAN MODEL OF 
OFFSHORE SHADOW BANKING DEVELOPMENT 
Historically, offshore banking has primarily been motivated by the desire to directly 
escape the reach of onshore authorities—most importantly via the avoidance of financial 
regulation in the Euromarket, and the sheltering of assets from taxation in secrecy havens.
14
  As 
noted above, there have been some attempts to apply this understanding of offshore jurisdictions, 
as secretive regulation-free spaces, to their role in the global financial crisis.  There is reason to 
believe, however, that this model is a weaker fit in this context than for past financial and debt 
                                                          
14
 Mervyn K Lewis, ‘International Banking and Offshore Finance: London and the Major Centres’ in M P Hampton 
and P J Abbott (eds.) Offshore Finance Centers and Tax Havens: the Rise of Global Capital (Purdue University 
Press 1999) 43–79; Mark P Hampton, The Offshore Interface: Tax Havens in the Global Economy (MacMillan 
1996); Palan et al (n 7) 107-149; Shaxson (n 7).  
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crises.
15
  Specifically, the structure of international financial regulation and intermediation had, 
by the global financial crisis, changed in ways that either constrained or reduced the relevance of 
this traditional offshore banking paradigm.  Firstly, the very success of offshore jurisdictions in 
historically spearheading an international regulatory race-to-the bottom has given the regulation-
avoiding component of their business model a self-obsolescing quality.  By the early-1990s, the 
regulatory advantage of the offshore Euromarket, in particular, had been significantly eroded.
16
  
Secondly, even while the territorialized regulatory frameworks of the post-WWII-era have been 
undermined by global capital mobility, and international regulatory competition predicated on 
this mobility, newer and less geographically-limited frameworks have been expanded in their 
place.  These have increasingly given states the ability ‘chase’ capital across international 
borders, reflecting what has been described as a broader pattern of state political-geographic 
adaptation to the threat posed by globalization to traditional territorial sovereignty.
17
  This 
extraterritorial adaptive capacity is unevenly distributed.  However, what is crucial, from the 
standpoint of the global financial crisis, is that it is disproportionately concentrated in the hands 
of the most powerful countries, and in particular the United States.  Offshore jurisdictions have 
been subjected to particularly intense international pressures by the US and multilateral bodies 
(e.g. Financial Action Task Force), since the turn of the millennium, in relation to financial 
transparency and information-exchange.
18
  These have been far from fully successful in an 
absolute sense; however, they do seem to have reduced the relative onshore-offshore 
transparency gap.  Indeed, the US in particular has often leveraged the same international 
political clout that allows it to dictate reforms elsewhere, to avoid reciprocation, and has 
increasingly been ranked below many ‘small island’ jurisdictions (e.g. the Caymans) on 
indicators of financial transparency and client due diligence.
19
   
Even more important than initiatives targeting offshore jurisdictions specifically, is the 
fact that financial regulation generally has moved towards an extraterritorial paradigm designed 
to combat inter-jurisdictional arbitrage.  This raises the question of whether ‘offshore’ activities 
actually operate outside of, as opposed to within, the purview of onshore regulators.  The US 
                                                          
15
 Most notably the Euromarket-centered 1980s LDC debt crisis, see Susan Strange, ‘From Bretton Woods to the 
Casino Economy’ in R Martin, N Thrift N and S Corbridge (eds.) Money, Power and Space (Blackwell 1994) 49-62. 
16
 Hampton (n 14). 
17
 See Linda Weiss, (1997) ‘Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State’ (1997) 225 New Left Review 3; 
Nicholas Phelps, ‘Gaining from Globalization?  State Extra-Territoriality and Domestic Impacts—the Case of 
Singapore’ (2007) 83(4) Economic Geography 371. 
18
 See Lorraine Eden and Robert T Kudrle, ‘Tax Havens: Renegade States in the International Tax Regime?’ (2005) 
27 Law & Policy 100; William Vlcek, W. (2007) ‘Why Worry? The Impact of the OECD Harmful Tax Competition 
Initiative on Caribbean Offshore Financial Centres’ (2007) 96 The Round Table 331; Jason C Sharman, ‘South 
Pacific Tax Havens: From Leaders in the Race to the Bottom to Laggards in the Race to the Top?’ (2005) 29 
Accounting Forum 311. 
19
 For comparative analyses see Alex Cobham, Petr Janský and Markus Meinzer, ‘The Financial Secrecy Index: 
Shedding New Light on the Geography of Secrecy’ (2015) 91 Economic Geography 281; Michael Findley, Daniel 
Nielson and Jason Sharman, ‘Global Shell Games: Testing Money Launderers’ and Terrorists’ Access to Shell 
Companies’ (2012) Griffith University Centre for Governance and Public Policy research report 
<http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Global-Shell-Games-2012.pdf> accessed November 9 
2016. 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has increasingly assumed the role of a global 
securities regulator.
20
  Even more importantly, a succession of Basel Accords have redrawn the 
geography of international banking regulatory jurisdiction, by moving the primary locus of 
authority from the host states where banks operate, to the home states where they are 
headquartered.
21
  The critical literature on offshore finance has understandably tended to either 
ignore or dismiss Basel, due to its demonstrable failure to actually prevent financial crises.
22
  
However, this has led it to overlook the qualitative regulatory implications of Basel for offshore 
centers specifically.  Indeed, the international supervisory dilemma that historically fueled 
offshore banking—namely the inability of home states to control the behavior of their banks 
overseas—appears to have become largely inverted, with host states often struggling to protect 
themselves from lax regulation by home states.
23
   
In fact, most analyses of the regulatory failures responsible for the global financial crisis 
locate these within the major onshore economies—most importantly the United States—whether 
in their capacity as home, host or global regulators of the largest financial firms and markets.  
This is particular true for shadow banking specifically, which tended to fall outside of the scope 
of conventional banking regulation on an intra-jurisdictional basis (see discussion in sections 3 
and 4).  Indeed, from its very beginning in the 1970s—in the form of money market funds and 
the commercial paper market—shadow banking was essentially an onshore alternative to the 
offshore Eurodollar market, which allowed for bank deposit interest rate caps and reserve 
requirements to be bypassed on US soil.
 24
  More recently, the exhaustive report of the US 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission identifies monumental flaws and lapses within US 
prudential and securities regulation that appear to explain the key shadow banking governance 
failures responsible for the global financial crisis.
 25
  Meanwhile, analyses of the participation of 
                                                          
20
 Kun Y Chang, ‘Multinational Enforcement of US Securities Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope 
of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction’ (2003) 9(1) Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 89; 
John Deacon, Global Securitisation and CDOs (Wiley 2004) 55-60; Douglas Davison and Scott Litvinoff (2013) 
‘Update: Tourre Extends SEC’s Reach for Foreign Transactions Involving Domestic Offerings’ (2013) 45 Securities 
Regulation & Law Report. 
21
 Katia D’Hulster, ‘Cross Border Banking Supervision: Incentive Conflicts in Supervisory Information Sharing 
between Home and Host Supervisors’ (2012) 13 Journal of Banking Regulation 300; Richard J Herring, ‘Conflicts 
Between Home and Host Country Prudential Supervisors’ in D. Evanoff, J LaBrosse and G. Kaufman (eds.) 
International Financial Instability: Global Banking and National Regulation (World Scientific 2007); Katharina 
Pistor, ‘Host’s dilemma: Rethinking EU Banking Regulation in the Light of the Global Crisis’ (2010) Columbia 
Law and Economics Working Paper No 378 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1631940> 
accessed November 9 2016. 
22
 See Hampton (n 14); Lewis (n 14) 43; Strange (n 15) 49.  
23
 I.e. the ‘host’s dilemma’ described by Pistor (n 21).  For a discussion of home-state regulatory competition under 
Basel see Mathias Thiemann, ‘In the Shadow of Basel: How Competitive Politics Bred the Crisis’ (2014) 21(6) 
Review of International Political Economy 1203. 
24
 Hyman P Minsky, ‘Capitalist Financial Processes and the Instability of Capitalism’ (1980) 14(2) Journal of 
Economic Issues 505. 
25
 FCIC (n 3). 
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non-US financial firms in crisis-implicated shadow banking activities have located the most 
important regulatory failures at the home state level, particularly in Europe.
26
   
This apparently superfluous nature of the offshore location of shadow banking, in relation 
to the regulatory failures responsible for the crisis, makes the reported pervasiveness of this 
location something of a paradox from the standpoint of the traditional offshore banking model.  
Resolving this paradox, we argue, requires a normative re-problematization of the role of 
offshore jurisdictions in international finance.  This, on the one hand, acknowledges their 
potential to provide services that may be (in some sense) beneficial, and, on the other, more 
broadly construes the level at which these services can be considered harmful.  The first requires 
moving away from an understanding of offshore jurisdictions that emphasizes their pursuit of 
particular harmful policies, to a definition of offshore emphasizing a particular brand of local 
politics.  Meanwhile, the second requires adopting a Minskian conceptualization of endogenous 
market instability, wherein financial crisis production is seen as primarily rooted in the private 
rather than public sector. 
The first of these shifts is already underway in the literature on offshore political 
economy.  Nicholas Shaxson, for example, argues that the defining feature of offshore 
jurisdictions is a profound condition of state capture by local and global financial elites, which 
transforms them into ‘politically stable’ ‘fast and flexible private law-making machines.’27  As 
he emphasizes, this role can, notably, be played by subnational as well as national political units, 
most prominently by the US state of Delaware.  However, this politics-based definition of 
offshore still tends to be treated as interchangeable with more narrowly policy-based definitions.  
Typically, the focus is on some combination of financial secrecy and tax avoidance/evasion, with 
the terms ‘secrecy jurisdiction’ and ‘tax haven’ often used as stand-ins for the term ‘offshore 
jurisdiction.’28  This juxtaposition creates two dilemmas.  Firstly, the idea of a narrow policy 
specialization sits uneasily with the open-ended flexibility implied by a politically-based 
understanding of offshore states.  In this vein, Christopher Le Marchant argues that a focus on 
questions such as secrecy misses the more basic role of offshore jurisdictions as institutional 
‘laboratories,’ ‘wherein the more flexible and innovative atmosphere of offshore has enabled 
offshore centers to invent or pioneer products and services.’29  Secondly, and relatedly, it creates 
an expectation that offshore practices can be easily and uncontroversially labeled as harmful.  
                                                          
26
 E.g. of European bank-sponsored securitization vehicles, see Carlos Arteta, Mark Carey, Ricardo Correa and 
Jason Kottor, ‘Revenge of the Steamroller: ABCP as a Window on Risk Choices’ (2013) Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Papers Number 1076 
<https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2013/1076/ifdp1076.pdf> accessed November 9 2016; Viral V Acharya, 
Philipp Schnabl and Gustavo Suarez, ‘Securitization without Risk Transfer’ (2013) 107(3) Journal of Financial 
Economics 515; Thiemann (n 23) 1203. 
27
 Shaxson (n 7) 184. 
28
 See Palan et al. (n 7); Shaxson (n 7) 
29
 Christopher M Le Marchant, ‘Financial Regulation and Supervision Offshore: Guernsey, a Case Study’ in M P 
Hampton and J P Abbott (eds.), Offshore Finance Centers and Tax Havens: the Rise of Global Capital (Purdue 
University Press 1999) 43–79. 
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This is ill-suited to deal with the potential of jurisdictions to retreat, in the face of international 
reform pressure, into a normative grey area.   
In fact, there is reason to believe that offshore jurisdictions can, in principle, serve as sites 
for useful forms of institutional innovation.  This potential legitimacy rests on the fact that 
actually-existing economic activity has institutional overhead costs, with all institutional 
frameworks being, furthermore, path-dependent accretions of ‘second-best’ workarounds to 
historical problems.  As rightly emphasized by offshore critics, many onshore tax and regulatory 
costs of business have a clear and necessary social purpose.  Consequently, their circumvention 
constitutes a zero- or negative-sum wealth transfer, rather than, as claimed by offshore defenders, 
a positive-sum improvement of economic institutional efficiency.
30
  However, the situation is 
more complex where inherited onshore institutions impose unintentional burdens on economic 
activity.  Research suggests, for example, that offshore jurisdiction use by Chinese and former 
Soviet Union companies largely reflects the capitalist institutional legal vacuum in post-
communist transition economies.
31
  This is not to say that these jurisdictions are not used for 
dishonest purposes, but rather that this is not always the only, or even the primary rationale for 
their use.  Russia, for example, did not create an onshore company law until 1996, several years 
after the beginning of mass privatization.
32
  In China, meanwhile, the most widespread use of 
offshore jurisdictions appears to be as conduits for listings on overseas exchanges (typically New 
York or Hong Kong).
33
  The fact that state-owned national champions account for a substantial 
share of these offshore-structured listings, is a strong indication that the Chinese government 
sees them as a mechanism for enhancing, rather than undermining, the onshore institutional 
framework.
34
  Indeed, in the context of these listings, offshore jurisdictions (particularly 
‘midshore’ Hong Kong) arguably provide transparency, rather than secrecy, to opaque and 
lawless mainland financial markets.   
For countries with more developed legal systems, the potential draw of relatively strong 
but low-cost offshore institutional frameworks is less pronounced.  However, there are often 
qualitative differences between national institutional regimes—e.g. civil versus common law 
jurisdictions—which are the product of historical path dependencies, and may have advantages 
or disadvantages for any particular transaction (e.g. securitizations
35
).  More broadly, offshore 
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31
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jurisdictions may facilitate the creation of flexible, a-la-carte contractual arrangements, in areas 
such as bankruptcy resolution.  The latter casts a particularly long-shadow of potential litigation 
costs and legal uncertainty over financial activity, which may raise the present cost of finance; 
the avoidance of this shadow through ‘bankruptcy remote’36 securitizations can thus be 
considered a form of transaction cost reduction, which may or may not be additionally motivated 
by regulatory arbitrage.
37
  Finally, offshore jurisdictions have increasingly rebranded themselves 
in terms of the rather slippery concept of ‘tax neutrality,’ or the lack of additional taxation 
beyond what is due onshore.
38
  Where combined with indefinite deferral of onshore tax liabilities 
(e.g. by US corporations), this can be tantamount to tax avoidance.  However, this is not 
necessarily the case for vehicles that continuously pass through cash flows from one 
location/party to another, where offshore locales are more likely to be used to avoid double-tax 
‘leakages’ along the chain of intermediation.  The purpose of such vehicles is not to avoid 
taxation; rather, a tax-neutral structure facilitates their creation for other purposes, such as 
issuing or holding securities.   
That these offshore services are, in and of themselves, relatively innocuous, does not 
mean that they cannot have pernicious effects.  On the contrary, it potentially makes their 
negative impacts more profound and intractable.  In order to fully theorize these impacts, in the 
area of banking regulation, it is necessary to adopt an endogenous perspective on financial 
instability and crisis.
39
  In an exogenous theory of market instability, crises are seen to result 
from limited points of failure in the otherwise sound operation of markets.  In neoclassical 
economics, these failures are typically ascribed to excessive and or poorly designed state 
interventions.  Right wing pundits in the US, for example, often blame the subprime crisis on 
low-income household lending quotas, and government-sponsorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.  In contrast, in an endogenous theory of market instability, financial crises are viewed as an 
intrinsic product of private sector behavior.
40
  This idea has been notably underdeveloped in the 
literature on offshore political economy.  This has, while debunking neo-classical critiques of 
‘excessive’ onshore regulation,41 constructed what is in some respects a new narrative of 
exogenous government-driven financial instability focused on offshore states.  In contrast, the 
endogenous perspective on offshore-exacerbated financial instability proposed here does not 
dispute the idea, in principle, that these jurisdictions may help to make ‘markets work’ by 
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streamlining their institutional overhead costs.  Rather, we argue that it is precisely in this 
efficiency-enhancing capacity that they can potentially cause severe damage.   
As theorized in the works of Keynes and Minsky, capitalist financial systems contain 
positive feedback loops that automatically generate cyclical boom-bust dynamics.
42
  Two factors 
are, in combination, a particularly acute source of instability.  Firstly, the government only has 
limited and indirect control over monetary expansion and contraction.  Money is rather an 
endogenous product of private sector credit creation, the volume of which primarily reflects the 
level of demand for capital assets.  Secondly, the demand for debt-financed investment in capital 
assets is conditioned by, and in-turn conditions, a combination of expected future profits and 
current ability to service or refinance debt payments—as determined by both asset yields and 
capital gains.  The result is a positive feedback relationship that generates alternating periods of 
self-reinforcing asset price inflation and debt deflation.  Crucially, according to Minsky, private 
actors do not simply create credit within the existing financial institutional framework, but can 
modify this framework through the invention of new types of credit instrument.  Consequently, a 
process of outright inter-jurisdictional arbitrage, or intra-jurisdictional deregulation, is 
unnecessary, in principle, to regulatory failure; rather, any given regulatory framework will tend 
to continuously become obsolete.  Indeed, as financial stability fosters the Keynesian ‘animal 
spirits’ that motivate financial innovation, the very effectiveness of regulation is actually a direct 
cause of its obsolescence.   
Ultimately, the fact that it did not so much circumvent specific banking regulations, as 
the traditional definition of banking itself, makes this perhaps the most compelling theory of the 
trajectory of shadow banking development that produced the global financial crisis.
43
  Indeed, 
although there was a strongly laissez faire political impulse from the 1980s to 2000s, its most 
important manifestation was arguably a misplaced faith in the stability of new credit instruments, 
as opposed to the deregulation of older ones (for conventional banking Basel actually restored 
oversight to the Keynesian-era offshore regulatory void).  However, what Minsky’s model does 
not directly address, is that financial innovations designed to skirt directly relevant regulations 
might be obstructed by a host of other tax, legal, and regulatory issues which are entirely 
incidental.  In other words, financial innovation is likely to be slowed by a generalized ‘friction’ 
with the inherited institutional environment.  It is their ability to help financial actors overcome 
such frictions, we argue, that has increasingly become the core specialization of the offshore 
institutional ‘laboratory’ in relation to financial innovation.  This is not to say that they have not 
in the past, and do not continue to more directly facilitate escape from onshore regulation.  
However, as traditionally territorialized regulatory frameworks have either been eroded by 
international regulatory competition and arbitrage, or replaced by more geographically robust 
extraterritorial frameworks, this role of offshore centers as financial governance ‘black holes’ 
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has increasingly taken a backseat to their more subtle role as financial innovation ‘ball 
bearings.’44   
As we show in the following sections, using the case of asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP), this shift has made it increasingly difficult to characterize offshore policies as harmless 
or harmful at the jurisdictional level.  Rather, this is contingent on their broader contextual 
insertion into the global financial networks constructed by private-sector actors.  This makes the 
reform of the offshore world a more complex dilemma than is typically recognized.    
 
3. MAPPING THE GEOGRAPHY OF PRE-CRISIS ABCP-PRODUCTION AND 
FAILURE 
 The 2007-2009 global financial crisis unfolded as a bank run, wherein financial 
intermediaries found themselves unable to rollover short-term debt liabilities due to a generalized 
loss of confidence in borrower creditworthiness.
45
  In contrast to a traditional bank run 
characterized by deposit-flight, however, the crisis took the form of a run on short-term shadow-
banking liabilities, namely commercial paper (CP) and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
issued by on- and off-balance sheet vehicles, overnight repo credit collateralized by longer-term 
asset-backed securities (ABS), and shares of money market mutual funds investing in the 
CP/ABCP and repo markets.  What renders banks susceptible to runs is the process of maturity 
and liquidity transformation, whereby liquid, short-maturity debt funding is reinvested as 
illiquid, long-term loans.  In the pre-crisis shadow-banking system, the function of maturity and 
liquidity transformation primarily occurred through the funding of long-term securitized and 
non-securitized investments via the wholesale CP/ABCP and repo markets.  Maturity 
transformation was also performed by money market mutual funds, which fund short-term CP 
and ABCP purchases and repo lending with very short-term, demand deposit equivalent, stable 
Net Asset Value (NAV)
46
 shares.  In the pre-crisis subprime mortgage securitization chain, CP 
and repo primarily acted as working credit used by financial firms to fund loan origination and 
other intermediate on-balance sheet stages of securitization.  Meanwhile, the end product of the 
securitization process was typically the sale of assets to off balance sheet special purpose 
vehicles/entities (SPVs/SPEs) issuing either ABCP or longer-term ABS, which could be sold to a 
variety of institutional investors (e.g. pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies).
47
   
From the standpoint of maturity and liquidity transformation, ABCP-issuing SPVs served 
as key ‘shadow banks’ within the securitized credit intermediation chain.  Importantly, as the 
ABCP issued by these vehicles was both very highly rated, and of very short maturity, it could 
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 13 
be purchased by the money market funds which served as the primary ‘deposits’ in the shadow 
banking system.
48
  Most ABCP-issuing vehicles were created and sponsored by banks, as a 
mechanism for reducing regulatory capital by moving assets into nominally off-balance sheet 
vehicles.  Crucially, these vehicles were ‘bankruptcy remote’—i.e. structured to be excluded 
from the sponsor’s estate in the event of its bankruptcy, so that investors were only exposed to 
credit risk from the vehicle’s own assets.  However, due to the short maturity (< 3 months) of the 
paper they issued, they were also inherently dependent on explicit or implicit sponsor backstops 
to mitigate the risk of investor runs.
49
  Liquidity support (e.g. investor put options) was most 
important in practice, as it amounted to a contingent promise to repurchase securities from 
investors at face value, yet was typically not subject to the capital charges of overt credit support.  
This rendered vehicles substantively on-balance sheet from the standpoint of the risk they posed 
to their sponsors (or third parties to whom sponsors had transferred these risks), despite being 
insulated from the sponsor’s own credit risk.   
That many ABCP-issuing vehicles were based in jurisdictions typically identified as 
‘offshore’ has been established at a qualitative level.50  Beyond SPV domiciliation, it is also 
known that many troubled structured finance securities were exchange-listed in Ireland.
51
   
However, neither the detailed jurisdictional geography of this activity, nor the precise 
significance of this geography, has been systematically described.  From an empirical standpoint, 
the remainder of this section seeks to understand 1) the offshore and onshore geography of 
domiciliation and exchange listing of ABCP-issuing vehicles by type, 2) the nationality of the 
ultimate sponsors of these vehicles, and 3) the jurisdictions from which vehicles were 
immediately sponsored.  Next, in section 4, we examine 1) whether the offshore footprint of 
these activities could have potentially had a bearing on their onshore regulation, and 2) what the 
specialist/practitioner literature says about the rationale for this offshore footprint.   
ABCP was issued prior to the crisis by several types of vehicle (see figures 1 and 2) 
whose stability was a function of the sponsor backstops they received, and the type of assets they 
purchased.  Most stable were conventional multi-seller conduits, which were engaged in the 
primary securitization of loans purchased from multiple originators, and typically enjoyed a high 
level of direct liquidity and credit support from sponsors or third parties.  These conduits in most 
cases had little connection to US subprime mortgage lending, rather focusing on areas such as 
trade receivables, credit card, and auto loans.
52
  More mixed in their resilience were single-seller 
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conduits that securitized loans originated by a single firm, with home mortgage origination 
warehousing conduits being predictably hard hit.
53
 
Less stable than primary loan securitization vehicles, in general, were the various classes 
of vehicle (structured investment vehicles, collateralized debt obligations, and credit arbitrage 
and hybrid conduits) engaged in the purchase and repackaging of ABS, including subprime 
residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS).  Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) were 
the most systemically destabilizing vehicles, as they proved to be a fundamentally faulty 
statistical device that was intended to convert high-risk into low-risk securities, but in practice 
simply passed risk on to investors.
54
  Without the market for lower-rated RMBS tranches created 
by CDOs, it is doubtful that the subprime lending bubble would or could have reached the 
proportions that it did.
55
  While most CDOs issued long-term ABS, some also issued short-term 
ABCP, which typically received liquidity support from either the underwriter or a third party.
56
  
ABCP-issuing CDOs were among the most problematic vehicles in the crisis, as they combined 
the defective credit risk management of a CDO with the liquidity risk of an ABCP conduit.
57
  
In contrast to CDOs, credit arbitrage (and hybrid
58
) ABCP conduits and structured 
investment vehicles (SIVs) usually only purchased highly rated ABS.  However, the fact that 
these included a substantial component of CDOs and other subprime-backed RMBS widely 
contaminated, and often precipitated the failures of, both of types of vehicle in the crisis.  
Notwithstanding their less pronounced maturity mismatch, SIVs were more severely impacted 
than arbitrage and hybrid conduits—indeed they entirely ceased to exist as vehicle class.  Unlike 
arbitrage and hybrid conduits, SIVs tended to lack explicit sponsor support, being rather 
structured as independent lenders (essentially shell banks) whose ABCP tranches were protected 
by a capital structure of Medium Term Notes (MTNs) and Capital Notes (CNs).  This lack of 
explicit sponsor backstops, combined with the pre-programming of SIVs to conduct value-
destroying asset fire sales in a liquidity crunch, rendered them inherently susceptible to investor 
runs.
59
  Ironically, most SIVs ultimately did receive sponsor support during the crisis, with 
investors typically not suffering losses.
60
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the first comprehensive jurisdictional maps of the largest pre-crisis 
ABCP issuers in these different categories.  Figure 1 shows the largest financial firm-sponsored 
ABCP conduits and SIVs as of mid-2007, while Figure 2 shows the largest CDO ABCP 
                                                          
53
 Covitz et al. (n 48) 815. 
54
 Richard E Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO 
Meltdown, and How to Fix it (2009) University of Illinois Law Review 1359. 
55
 FCIC (n 3) 127-155. 
56
 Karen Mueller, Pooja Bharwani and Rodrigo Araya, ‘CDOs with Short-Term Tranches: Moody's Approach to 
Rating Prime-1 CDO Notes’ (2006) Moody’s Investors Service Structured Finance Special Report. 
57
 FCIC (n 3) 138-139. 
58
 Hybrid conduits typically held a mixture of loans and ABS.   
59
 Arteta et al. (n 26); Covitz et al. (n 48) 815; FCIC (n 3) 252-253. 
60
 See Arteta et al. (n 26); Covitz et al. (n 48) 815. 
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programs as of YE-2005.  Rankings of programs by size, and data on program sponsorship were 
obtained from ratings agency databases and reports (primarily Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & 
Poor’s), and cross-checked (for non-CDO programs) against the list of ABCP programs 
compiled by Acharya and Schnabl.
61
  CDO-issued ABCP program size rankings and 
sponsorships were obtained from a one-off ratings agency report released in 2006,
62
 necessitating 
the 18 month time discrepancy between the two figures.  Notably, while the volume of CDO 
issuance increased substantially over the year-and-a-half separating the two figures, this tended 
to reproduce patterns established by YE-2005.  Together, the vehicles in the figures accounted 
for approximately half of total worldwide pre-crisis ABCP issuance.
63
   
While the data sources above typically include information on the geographic location of 
program sponsors (including, in most cases, the location of immediately sponsoring subsidiaries 
or branches), they only rarely specify the geography of securitization vehicle domiciliation or 
securities exchange listings.  Due to a lack of public databases containing this information, we 
have hand-compiled it from exhaustive searches of online company registries, exchange 
prospectuses, and news articles and reports detailing specific vehicles.  Company registry 
searches were based on vehicle name-matches, tested against a variety of entity-type suffixes 
(e.g. LLC, Corp., Ltd.).  Results were cross-referenced wherever possible against other sources 
detailing individual vehicles.  Exchange listing searches were based on name-match searches for 
programs and the most popular structured finance exchanges (Ireland, Luxembourg, London and 
New York).  As we have been forced, in the absence of centralized public databases, to construct 
the results from a labor-intensive ‘collage’ technique, the jurisdictional patterns revealed below 
cannot be assumed to be error-free with respect to individual actors or relationships; rather, they 
should be interpreted as a best-possible view of patterns that have to date been entirely opaque. 
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Figure 1. Geography of ABCP issuance and impairment, mid 2007-2009 
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Figure 1 shows the jurisdictional structure of the largest 54 ABCP conduits and SIVs 
(outstanding securities > $10 billion) sponsored by financial firms in mid (June-July) 2007.  The 
area of white circles is proportional to the aggregated assets of vehicle classes with a specific 
jurisdictional organization, and/or the combined value of vehicles sponsored by banks and fund 
managers of a particular nationality.  Both ultimate sponsor nationality and the location of 
immediately sponsoring subsidiaries or branches are indicated.  The area of shaded circles within 
larger white circles indicates the total value of impaired securities for each category of vehicle or 
sponsor, with impairment defined as an event of default, the withdrawal of all securities by the 
sponsor as of the beginning of 2010, and the peak value of securities supported by the Federal 
Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).64  The jurisdiction of vehicles or 
sponsors is indicated by the light grey circles, with jurisdiction of incorporation indicated where 
circles/wedges have a white fill, jurisdiction of exchange listing indicated by a light grey fill, and 
both jurisdiction of incorporation and listing indicated by darker grey fill. Vehicles or sponsors 
falling within multiple circles are domiciled and or listed in all of these jurisdictions unless 
otherwise indicated.   
 Several aspects of the diagram are striking.  The first is the apparent (but superficial, see 
section 4) dominance of Delaware as a securitization jurisdiction, with every SIV and conduit in 
the sample incorporating a Delaware-based vehicle.  Just as notable, however, is that most 
(29/54) of the SIVs and conduits in the sample were not limited to Delaware geographically, but 
rather extended across two-or-more jurisdictions with respect to domicile and or listing.  As a 
result, the map has an interlocking Venn-diagram structure.  Different types of vehicle exhibit 
pronounced segregation by domicile.  Conventional single- and multi-seller conduits were nearly 
all established as Delaware-only issuer structures.  In contrast, all of the SIVs were established 
with a lead issuer in the Cayman Islands, and co-issuer in Delaware.  Meanwhile, most of the 
arbitrage and hybrid conduits were structured with a lead issuer in Jersey and or Ireland, and a 
co-issuer in Delaware.  On top of these dual domicile arrangements, the jurisdiction of exchange 
listing added a third layer to the legal geography of securitization in many cases.  In this respect, 
there was a sharp divide between SIVs and ABCP conduits, with all SIVs listing at least some 
classes of securities (in most cases on the London Stock Exchange, although in a few cases in 
Ireland or Luxembourg), while only two ABCP conduits were found to have exchange listings 
(in both cases in Ireland).  Moreover, short-term commercial paper itself appears to have only 
seldom been listed by any type of issuer, with SIVs typically only listing longer maturity 
securities (e.g. medium term notes).   
 Both the immediate and ultimate jurisdiction of sponsors exhibited a patterned 
relationship with issuer type and jurisdiction.  SIVs were nearly all sponsored by London-based 
subsidiaries and branches of non-British banks.  By far the most important was Citigroup’s UK 
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subsidiary, Citigroup International (the lone UK-based US bank in the sample), which invented 
SIVs in the 1980s.  The few SIVs whose immediate sponsors were not London-based were 
sponsored from New York.  More broadly, 45/54 vehicles in figure 1 had an immediate sponsor 
in either the US and UK.  In practice, these immediate sponsors were typically (and for foreign 
banks operating through these countries always) based in New York or London, underscoring the 
dominance of the ‘NY-LON’ axis in the design and administration of crisis-implicated 
securities.
65
  Of the remaining 9 vehicles not sponsored from the US or UK, two were sponsored 
by German banks operating in Ireland (including Depfa, a quasi-German institution rescued by 
Hypo Real Estate in 2007), while five were sponsored by Dutch banks directly from the 
Netherlands.  Both of these jurisdictions, notably, are leading European corporate tax havens 
widely used for securitizations in general.
66
  With respect to the ultimate sponsorship of vehicle 
types, American banks were mostly oriented towards ‘plain vanilla’ single- and multi-seller 
conduits in Delaware, with the major exception of Citigroup’s London-managed SIV activities.  
In contrast, German banks—particularly the public banks (Landesbanken and IKB) accounting 
for 5/7 of German sponsors—concentrated on exotic arbitrage and hybrid conduits and SIVs.  
British and Dutch banks fell in between their German and American peers in this respect.   
 With respect to security impairment rates, analysis is complicated by the high collinearity 
between vehicle type, domicile and sponsorship structure.  The high failure rate of vehicles 
domiciled in Jersey, Ireland, and the Cayman Islands, or sponsored by German banks, is strongly 
associated with the specialization of these jurisdictions/banks in the domiciliation/sponsorship of 
highly failure-prone arbitrage conduits and SIVs.  Likewise, vehicles with an immediate sponsor 
in London were likely to be highly failure-prone SIVs, which were invariably domiciled in the 
Cayman Islands and listed in London.  Conversely, the low failure rate of vehicles with either a 
Delaware-only domicile, or US-bank sponsorship, is associated with the tendency of these 
vehicles to be relatively stable single- or multi-seller conduits.  Such collinearity casts doubt on 
any simple guilt-by-association interpretation of the offshore location of crisis events, as blame 
for failure could theoretically be assigned to any one (or more) of these parameters. 
Figure 2 shows the jurisdictional organization of major CDOs issuing short-term (ABCP 
and equivalent) securities as of YE-2005, along with the key actors involved in their operation.  
Due to the complexity of CDOs, only the largest ABCP-issuing CDO series (with > $1 billion in 
commercial paper issuance) are shown for the sake of clarity.  Four categories of actor are 
shown.  Firstly, CDOs are aggregated and labeled based on underwriter (i.e. the investment bank 
which arranged their structure and marketed their securities).  For cash CDOs, the involvement 
of two additional types of actors are shown; collateral managers responsible for the selection of 
CDO assets, and providers of liquidity support to short-term CDO tranches.  For synthetic CDOs 
(in this sample entirely underwritten by Goldman Sachs), a fourth type of actor is shown, namely 
the buyer of Credit Default Swap (CDS) protection (in this case Goldman Sachs itself).  In 
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addition, we show the CDS protection purchased by some CDO liquidity support providers to 
protect themselves from the associated credit risk.   
 
Figure 2. Geography of CDOs with short-term tranches, YE-2005 
 The CDOs in figure 2 can be mostly grouped into three networks.  The first, and largest, 
is an American network of CDOs underwritten and backstopped by Citigroup, which were 
mostly managed by Bear Stearns’s hedge fund arm (BSAM) in the Klio CDO series.  The second 
is a Goldman Sachs-centered network of cash and synthetic CDOs, with a heavy involvement of 
AIG and French banks in collateral management and liquidity support.  Notably, AIG assumed 
nearly all of the liquidity risk of CDOs in this network, either directly as a put provider, or 
indirectly via its assumption of risk from Credit Agricole and Societe Generale through CDS.  
Beyond the high level of French participation, this network is given a strongly transatlantic 
character by the fact that the associated CDS activities of Goldman Sachs and AIG were 
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conducted by London affiliates of these firms.  The third, and smallest major network, is likewise 
transatlantic, being dominated by CDOs underwritten, and in most cases managed and 
backstopped by, New York subsidiaries and branches of German Landesbank WestLB.   
 The CDOs in the sample exhibit a relatively homogenous jurisdictional structure, which 
resembles the SIVs in figure 1.  This was usually characterized by a dual Cayman Islands-
Delaware issuer-co-issuer structure, with a listing on the Irish Stock Exchange (although as for 
SIVs, short-term ABCP tranches themselves were typically not listed).  Like SIVs, the direct 
management of CDOs was overwhelmingly based in New York or London, albeit with a much 
higher concentration in the former.  London appears, in relation to CDOs, to have primarily 
specialized in CDS underwriting.  Also resembling SIVs is the near-universality of failure of 
sample CDOs, which negates any attempt to find a straightforward association between vehicle 
stability and domicile or sponsoring institutions.  Indeed, the activities and relationships in figure 
2 constituted a critical area of instability in the crisis.  It was primarily the CDO-linked losses of 
Bear Stearns’s hedge fund arm (particularly in conjunction with Citi’s CDOs) which precipitated 
the downfall of this firm.  These same CDOs also played a leading role in the fall of Citigroup 
(see below).  Finally, the sale of CDS by AIG to Goldman Sachs and its French partner banks in 
conjunction with these (and similar CDO) series was a central factor in AIG’s collapse.67  
 
4. PROBLEMATIZING ABCP GOVERNANCE FAILURE—OFFSHORE AND 
ONSHORE 
These patterns fully confirm the ‘staggering reports of financial activities in OFCs’68 
prior to the crisis. Most strikingly, the ABCP-issuing vehicles most directly implicated in the 
crisis itself, and characterized by the highest levels of crisis security impairment—specifically 
CDOs, SIVs, and credit arbitrage/hybrid conduits—nearly always had a lead issuer located in an 
offshore jurisdiction outside of the United States, and in many cases also listed securities on the 
Irish or Luxembourg exchanges.  The Cayman Islands held a commanding lead as an offshore 
(non-US) lead issuer domicile, hosting 42 vehicles in the sample (14 excluding CDOs), while 
Jersey hosted 6, and Ireland hosted 4.  Most importantly, the fact that these lead issuers were 
invariably paired with a co-issuer in Delaware appears to have been of little significance from 
the standpoint of US regulatory jurisdiction.  The sole purpose of these Delaware co-issuers 
seems to have been to satisfy restrictions in certain US states on the ability of insurance 
companies to buy foreign securities (i.e. providing a ‘made in USA’ label for the purposes of 
these state regulations alone).
69
  Beyond this, the Delaware co-issuing SPVs had no tax or 
regulatory substance, which was rather attributed to the offshore primary issuer.  Consequently, 
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Delaware’s specialization was effectively in conventional multi- and single-seller conduits, 
rather than more exotic vehicles. 
Notwithstanding their pervasive presence in ABCP-production, however, the contribution 
of offshore jurisdictions to ABCP-market instability appears to have mostly been an indirect 
facilitative one—involving a lowering of the cost of Minskian shadow banking innovations—
rather than a direct enabling of regulatory arbitrage or opacity.  This conclusion can be reached 
through both a process-of-elimination analysis of pre-crisis prudential and securities regulation, 
oriented towards ruling-out their potential to serve as significant sites for direct regulatory 
arbitrage, and a review of the specialist practitioner literature on offshore securitizations.  The 
latter emphasizes points of law, regulation and taxation that were mostly peripheral to financial 
stability in a direct sense, but represented potential institutional frictions that could impede the 
deployment of securitized credit instruments (including ABCP) in general.  As we will show, it 
was primarily the need to alleviate these frictions that led to the issuance of all ABCP from 
jurisdictions with broadly ‘offshore’ characteristics—including ‘onshore-offshore’ Delaware—as 
well as the concentration of the most complex ABCP-issuers (e.g. CDOs and SIVs) in ‘small 
islands’ (e.g. the Caymans) offering the highest level of institutional flexibility in areas such as 
taxation and bankruptcy treatment.    
 From the standpoint of a process-of-elimination analysis of the direct role of offshore 
jurisdictions in undercutting financial regulation, what is striking about the massive involvement 
of offshore jurisdictions in crisis-implicated ABCP-production is how little this geography seems 
to have mattered within the pre-crisis regulatory architecture.  On the one hand, the relevant 
elements of national onshore regulatory frameworks were typically characterized by a high 
degree of extraterritoriality, which could not be evaded through the use of paper offshore 
devices.  At the same time, these onshore regulatory frameworks were so riddled with loopholes 
as to make offshore regulatory arbitrage unnecessary.  Ironically, even while domiciled, or in 
some cases listed offshore, the vehicles presented in section 4 were overwhelmingly structured to 
operate within these onshore loopholes.    
 For ABPC prudential regulation, the geography of jurisdiction was primarily defined by 
Basel.  This granted primary responsibility for liquidity supervision to host states on a territorial 
basis (before Basel III), while assigning primary responsibility for capital supervision to home 
states on a globally consolidated bank nationality (i.e. headquarters) basis.
70
  Given that the 
failure of the ABCP-market was, as noted in section 3, above-all a liquidity issue, host-
responsibility for the former could have theoretically given the offshore domicile of SPVs 
bearing on their regulation.  In practice, however, the fact that very few governments, onshore or 
offshore, considered these vehicles to be ‘credit institutions’ subject to direct prudential 
supervision, made this issue moot.
71
  The question was not one of their offshore location, but 
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rather their off balance sheet treatment (specifically for bank sponsor prudential regulation, 
which had different criteria than accounting consolidation).   
To the extent that these vehicles were constrained by prudential regulation at all, it was 
indirectly via the global (extraterritorial) capital charges that home regulators imposed on the 
sponsoring banks that provided vehicles with liquidity backstops.
72
  Generally speaking, the 
laxity of home regulators in defining these charges was so pronounced as to render other 
prudential regulatory jurisdiction issues moot.  SIVs operated in the most complete regulatory 
void, as they were only protected by implicit sponsor backstops to which no capital charges were 
attached.  However, even explicit liquidity lines extended to ABCP conduits by German, British, 
Dutch and Belgian national banks were completely free of capital charges until the phasing-in of 
Basel II between 2006 and 2008.  This may explain the fact that virtually all credit arbitrage and 
hybrid conduits—which were used as devices for the off balance sheet accumulation of third-
party, and in particular US mortgage-backed securities—were sponsored by banks headquartered 
in these countries (see figure 1).  Furthermore, although Basel II did introduce partial capital 
charges for these support lines, this was apparently more than undercut by its relaxation of risk 
weighting requirements, particularly for mortgage-backed securities.
73
 
The pre-crisis capital treatment of bank liquidity backstops of ABCP-issuing conduits 
and CDOs was marginally more strict in the United States, where backstops were assigned (from 
2004, following the experience of Enron) a capital charge equal to 10% of what would have been 
applied to the underlying assets supported.
74
  Furthermore, vehicles that were off balance sheet 
for capital regulatory but not accounting purposes could still be included in the calculation of 
bank sponsor leverage ratios.  This would have significantly impacted the bank-sponsored credit 
arbitrage conduits popular in Europe.
75
  However, it was insufficient to deter Citigroup from 
providing $25 billion in liquidity backstops to ABCP-issuing CDOs, the largest of which was the 
Bear Stearns-managed Klio series in figure 2.
76
  Most problematically, the asset risk-weightings 
from which capital charges were calculated did not come close to reflecting actual credit risk.  
Indeed, beyond backstopping the liquidity of these CDOs, Citigroup accumulated tens of billions 
of dollars of them on its own balance sheet at little capital cost.  Compounding this problem was 
the willingness of the US to outsource prudential supervision to private ratings agencies, as well 
as to banks themselves in the form of internal models (an approach internationalized with Basel 
II).
77
  
To the extent that offshore jurisdictions could have impeded home state prudential 
supervision of these activities, it seems that this would have been via their role as intermediate 
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functional coordinating sites (particularly via subsidiaries), rather than as SPV hosts.  As 
highlighted by Stewart,
78
 there are a few cases (visible in figure 1) where Ireland could have 
played such as role with respect to German bank-sponsored arbitrage conduits.  Indeed, perhaps 
the clearest case of pre-crisis offshore regulatory arbitrage was Depfa’s (the ‘Irish’ nationality 
bank in figure 1) relocation of its headquarters from Germany to Ireland in 2002.
79
  However, 
this was an unusual case, which actually underscored the importance of home state as opposed to 
host supervision under Basel.  Furthermore, given that German regulation of ABCP conduits was 
already nil (as noted above), lax Irish regulation seems unlikely to have been an issue for this 
particular activity.  Perhaps most importantly, to the extent that the host geography of direct 
management did impact vehicle supervision, figures 1 and 2 suggest that this would have mostly 
concentrated authority in the hands of US and UK regulators, due to the securities sector 
dominance of New York and London.   
Given that ABCP was designed to serve as a direct alternative to conventional bank 
deposits, prudential regulatory failure had the most substantive bearing on pre-crisis ABCP 
production (and shadow banking as a whole).  However, the fact that this prudential regulatory 
arbitrage entailed the issuance of securities rendered it potentially susceptible to second-order 
securities regulatory constraints.  Here there appears to have been slightly more scope for 
offshore regulatory impacts than in prudential regulation.  However, this scope was still fairly 
small (at least for the activities examined here) due to the fact that the relevant onshore securities 
regulation, like prudential regulation, was both extremely lax in substance and relatively resistant 
to offshore arbitrage.   
Playing the leading role in defining this regulation was the US SEC, which claims an 
expansively extraterritorial jurisdiction.
80
  As was the case for prudential regulation, the major 
lapses in pre-crisis US securities regulation stemmed from gaps within this extraterritorial 
onshore regulatory regime.  Most importantly, the types of securities examined here were 
invariably sold in the US market via private placements subject to only minimal regulation in the 
form of buyer/resale restrictions (which prevented retail investor participation), and the 
prohibition of outright fraud.
81
  These restrictions applied regardless of whether the issuing 
vehicle was in or outside of the US.  Furthermore, the jurisdictional scope claimed by the SEC 
for the most significant aspect of the private placement regulatory regime—protection against 
outright fraud—is highly extraterritorial, and cannot be avoided through paper offshore 
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structures.
82
  This was affirmed in the SEC v. Tourre case surrounding the Goldman Sachs-
underwritten Abacus 2007-AC1 synthetic CDO, in which a US District Court upheld SEC anti-
fraud jurisdiction—despite the fact that the security was sold by a Cayman Islands vehicle to 
Jersey-based conduit sponsored by German IKB—due to the fact that a person involved in the 
offer was physically based in New York.
83
   
Approximately two thirds of outstanding ABCP as of 2007 was issued in the US 
market.
84
  Nearly all of the remainder was issued in the European market, which seems to have 
absorbed a disproportionate share of the most toxic US mortgage-backed securities created in the 
1-2 years before the crisis.
85
  Importantly, it does not seem that the level of regulation of these 
securities in the EU market could fall substantially below that in the US market, regardless of 
whether they were issued from or listed in offshore jurisdictions.  This was due to the rock-
bottom regulatory standard established by US private placements, combined with the fact that the 
SEC claimed global jurisdiction over fraud for deals substantively connected to the US.  Figure 2 
suggests that the latter would have been particularly pervasive in the CDO market—where the 
potential for fraud was most acute—given the substantive dominance of New York in its 
operation.  Beyond this, even securities sold to non-US buyers by non-US domiciled vehicles 
still typically had to be structured to qualify for a specific exemption (Regulation S) from SEC 
registration requirements.
86
  Perhaps most notably, among offshore vehicles in figures 1 and 2, 
even those sponsored by non-US firms from a non-US location invariably had a Delaware co-
issuer.  This indicates that they were selling at least some of their securities to US investors, 
rather than being purely offshore-market issuers that systematically avoided US market 
oversight.  This can usually be confirmed by direct documentation (e.g. of simultaneous US and 
Euro CP programs).  CDOs, in particular, were typically issued simultaneously into the US 
market as Rule 144A private placements and outside of the US as Regulation S offerings, with 
this distinction not having an apparent substantive impact on their stability or transparency.  
Ultimately, the key issue seems to have been the lack of a perceived need to escape from the 
SEC’s geographic jurisdiction, with securities underwriters engaging in borderline fraudulent 
sales practices both in and outside of the US.   
This having been said, offshore jurisdictions—and in particular EU-jurisdictions such as 
Ireland or Luxembourg—could have theoretically impeded European efforts to raise securities 
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regulation beyond the minimal level in the US private market (although in practice European 
governments seem to have been more concerned with maintaining competitive parity in 
regulatory laxity
87
).  The European securities regulatory landscape had a three-pronged structure, 
revolving around national regulatory frameworks, EU-level directives, and a disproportionately 
powerful UK national regulator, whose influence stemmed from the dominance of London in the 
European securities sector.  These regulatory issues were entangled with a labyrinth of country-
specific tax and legal issues.
88
  Probably the most significant offshore aspect of the structures in 
figures 1 and 2, from the standpoint of EU securities regulation, were the Irish and Luxembourg 
exchange listings (of Regulation S or dual Rule 144A/Regulation S issued securities).  These 
effectively extended the relatively loose oversight of listings in these countries to the EU 
securities market as a whole, via the financial passporting regime.
89
  These listings were 
important in relation to the marketability of securities, given that purchases of unlisted debt 
securities by European institutional investors are typically limited by national regulations and or 
internal guidelines (in contrast to the US).
90
  Ultimately, however, the level of transparency 
provided by these listings—as governed by EU-directives (e.g. for prospectuses)—was clearly 
superior to the US private market.
91
  Indeed, without the publicly available, and easily accessible 
(i.e. Google-searchable online) Irish Stock Exchange documents produced by many vehicles 
examined here (particularly CDOs), we would know much less about their organization.   
The inference from this process-of-elimination analysis of the potential direct role of 
offshore jurisdictions in either primary prudential, or secondary securities regulatory arbitrage, is 
that their principal role in the activities here was a more subtle, facilitative one.  This is 
supported by the specialist practitioner literature, which, above all, emphasizes points of 
taxation.  This has a key bearing on Minskian ‘shadow banking’ innovations (including ABCP) 
that use securitization to bypass regulations constraining conventional banking, as this typically 
requires the use of large numbers of entities and transactions that can each potentially generate 
tax ‘leakages.’  Unless eliminated, these leakages will tend to offset any advantages of 
securitized credit intermediation.  Notably, from a normative standpoint, this is a clear case of 
tax ‘neutrality’ as opposed to avoidance, as the goal is not to reduce onshore taxation, but rather 
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to prevent cash flows from being double-taxed at the SPV in addition to sponsor level.
92
  In fact, 
the US Portfolio Interest Exemption directly encourages such use of tax-neutral offshore bond 
investment conduits, by exempting them from the withholding taxes that would normally be 
levied on interest payments to tax havens excluded from tax treaty networks (e.g. the Cayman 
Islands and Jersey).  To at least some extent, the jurisdictional segregation of vehicle types in 
figures 1 and 2 appears to reflect the complex criteria whereby debt instruments were deemed 
eligible or ineligible for this exemption.  Unsecuritized US consumer loans or home mortgages 
were reportedly ineligible in general,
93
 which may have necessitated the location of issuers 
holding these types of receivables in Delaware, rather than even-more-tax-friendly locales such 
as the Caymans.
94
  In contrast, vehicles that only purchased and repackaged securities (e.g. SIVs, 
CDOs, arbitrage conduits) were reportedly least affected by withholding tax issues, and had the 
greatest freedom to locate offshore.
95
  Notably, for Irish or UK-issued securities purchased by a 
non-treaty offshore jurisdiction SPV, the Quoted Eurobond exemption provided an analog to the 
US Portfolio Interest Exemption (although it required that these securities be listed).    
Provided that withholding tax on the receipt of onshore payments could be bypassed, the 
location of an issuer in an offshore tax haven such as the Cayman Islands, Jersey, and (for the 
most part) Ireland, reportedly afforded three key tax advantages.  Firstly, withholding taxes on 
international payments from the vehicle could be avoided regardless of where investors were 
located.  Secondly, the taxes on financial transactions (e.g. VAT and stamp duties) levied by 
some European countries could be avoided.  Thirdly, taxes levied on profits earned by the 
vehicle itself could be avoided, as could most of the compliance costs associated with an onshore 
tax presence.  These issues were not necessarily prohibitive with respect to the onshore location 
of vehicles—especially in ‘onshore-offshore’ Delaware, which has aggressively sought to 
position itself as the ‘jurisdiction of choice for securitization.’96  However, the avoidance of 
profit taxation, in particular, often required a careful matching of outgoing and incoming cash 
flows that was unnecessary if a vehicle was simply located in a zero-tax jurisdiction.  In 
particular, the fiscally-transparent devices that Delaware offered for simpler securitizations (see 
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note 97) were reportedly unsuitable for the most complex vehicles such as CDOs, which were 
actively managed.
97
  In these cases, a zero-tax offshore domicile was especially helpful.   
As shown in section 3, the Cayman Islands were the dominant jurisdiction for these types 
of highly sophisticated securitizations.  In addition to offering near-zero taxation (which could be 
found elsewhere), the Caymans had other institutional features conducive to these arrangements.  
In particular, it allowed for legal certainty to be established on points important to bankruptcy-
remote ‘robot firms’ with complex liability structures.  Firstly, beyond simply offering a current 
zero profit tax-rate, the Caymans allowed ‘exempted companies’ (the most commonly used 
securitization vehicle) to lock-in this rate for 20-30 years.
98
  Secondly, Caymans law firms 
advertized the lack of a local legal principle of ‘substance over form.’ 99  This was emphasized in 
relation to the capital notes issued by SIVs, which were classified as debt obligations, but had a 
heavily subordinated equity-like payment structure.  In many jurisdictions, the holders of these 
notes might be considered by courts to be shareholders.  Additionally, the complex layers of 
contractual priority and subordination in vehicle payment ‘waterfalls’ were given statutory force 
in the Caymans.  Finally, with respect to vehicle bankruptcy treatment more generally, a notable 
legal feature advertised by Caymans law firms was the absence of any US or English-style 
mechanism for bankruptcy rehabilitation allowing obligations to creditors could be frozen or 
discharged
100
 (although following the crisis US courts have ruled that offshore ‘letterboxes’ do 
not put vehicles out of reach of US bankruptcy jurisdiction
101
).   
A final advantage shared by popular SPV domiciliation and securities listing jurisdictions 
was a streamlining of approval procedures and regulations.  In Jersey, security issues were 
subject to approvals that could take 2 weeks.
102
 In the Cayman Islands, however, the relevant 
regulation was mostly indirect, via supervision of local service providers.
103
  Beyond this, there 
were no authorization, or minimum capital requirements for SPVs, and no restrictions on their 
transactions and securities issues.  Particularly notable, in the context of the rapidly changing 
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landscape of pre-crisis financial innovation (particularly in CDOs), was the fact that this allowed 
SPVs to be set up in the Caymans within 24 hours.
104
 
Notwithstanding this ‘light-touch’ regulation, however—as noted by many academic 
commentators on offshore political economy
105—the situation in offshore jurisdictions catering 
to OECD corporate clients was not one of zero regulation.  On the contrary, as international 
pressure on offshore jurisdictions has increased, a regulatory void, particularly in the area of 
transparency, has come to pose an increasing threat to a jurisdiction’s reputation for these 
clients.
106
  Any reputational damage from illicit activity, in particular, threatens the more 
lucrative business of crafting legal contractual devices that exploit onshore loopholes.  Most 
critical, is the existence of a large and experienced local financial services and judicial 
infrastructure that can ensure compliance with any necessary onshore legal formalities.  As one 
Cayman Islands-based lawyer describes the onshore-offshore division of labor: ‘How the 
isolation of the financial risk is accounted for and reported onshore is determined by the onshore 
rules. From an offshore perspective the key point is to show that an SPE is real.’107   
What is particularly notable is that the jurisdictions in figures 1 and 2 fall into the elite 
echelons of ostensibly ‘respectable’ offshore locales.  The dominance of the Cayman Islands in 
the most complex forms of securitization is especially significant, as non-OECD ‘small-island’ 
jurisdictions have generally had to earn respectability through substantive reforms, in contrast to 
OECD states which enjoy a more positive reputation by default.
108
  As noted in section 2, the 
Cayman Islands specifically have been ranked above many onshore jurisdictions on key points of 
financial transparency and due diligence, and have been particularly successful at avoiding 
international black/grey-listing through a proactive approach to complying with OECD, FATF, 
and other initiatives.  Meanwhile Delaware is consistently placed at the bottom of international 
offshore jurisdiction governance rankings.
109
 
 
5. CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONAL INEFFICIENCY AS A MINSKIAN TOBIN TAX 
 Observing the automatic crisis-generating tendencies of liquid and efficient markets, 
Keynes advocated the taxation of financial transactions.  The idea was that, if financial markets 
are endogenously unstable, stability could be improved by impeding market operation in a 
blanket non-specific manner.  Following Tobin’s advocacy of ‘throwing sand in the wheels of 
our excessively efficient international monetary markets’110 via transaction taxes, these are 
typically referred to as Tobin taxes.  What the analysis in this paper underscores, from a policy 
                                                          
104
 Ashman and Bestwick (n 99). 
105
 E.g. Palan et al. (n 7); Roberts; Vlcek (n 18) 331; Sharman (n 18) 311.  
106
 As emphasized in Moon (n 99).   
107
 Ibid. 
108
 Eden and Kudrle (n 18) 100; Sharman (n 18) 311; Vlcek (n 18) 331. 
109
 Findley et al. (n 19). 
110
 James Tobin, ‘A proposal for International Monetary Reform’ (1978) 4(3-4) Eastern Economic Journal 153. 
 29 
standpoint, is that actually-existing financial markets are in fact always subject to unintentional 
Tobin tax-like institutional obstacles and overhead costs.  However, where these are felt is not 
simply the normal course of financial transactions, but even more so in the context of financial 
innovation, which invariably creates frictions between newly developed institutions and their 
inherited surroundings.  These frictions can be seen as ‘Minskian Tobin taxes’ that slow the 
tendency of financial regulatory frameworks towards obsolescence in the face of this innovation.  
This is particularly true to the extent that innovations require an increase in financial institutional 
complexity that generates a corresponding increase in institutional overhead costs. 
 Offshore jurisdictions appear, at least in relation to the activities examined here, to have 
primarily served as sites for the reduction of these institutional overhead costs attached to 
financial innovation.  From a regulatory standpoint, this innovation was inherently subversive; 
however, the role of offshore jurisdictions in this subversion was mainly an indirect facilitative 
one that involved the provision of tax ‘neutrality’ as opposed to tax avoidance, and the 
minimization of transaction costs associated with the threat of bankruptcy proceedings.  
Meanwhile, the ‘black holes’ of regulatory failure were onshore—most importantly in 
Washington DC, New York, London, Berlin and Brussels.  Crucially, authorities in these 
locations had far-reaching prerogative to regulate activates examined in this paper, regardless of 
whether their geography extended across offshore jurisdictions.  For the most part, however, they 
made only feeble efforts to exercise this prerogative.  Indeed, the onshore prudential and 
securities regulation of these activities was so lax, from a substantive standpoint, that there 
appears to have been little scope for offshore jurisdictions to undercut it.   
In some respects, this constitutes a radical shift in the traditional role of offshore banking 
centers, which calls into question the distinction between ‘on’ and ‘offshore.’  Indeed, from the 
standpoint of global financial network organization, it has become increasingly appropriate to 
view offshore jurisdictions as spaces of institutional flexibility within the leading ‘world city’ 
financial centers, rather than as escape routes from regulation in these centers.  At a deeper level, 
however, this role continues to be predicated on the basic offshore political niche of catering to 
the rapidly evolving needs of financial firms.  This often takes the form of overt legislative 
malleability; however, it also entails the cumulative development of a toolbox of ready-made 
institutional devices (e.g. Delaware LLCs and Cayman Islands exempted companies) that can be 
adapted to serve a wide variety of novel purposes.  In many respects, ‘onshore-offshore’ 
jurisdictions such as Delaware or Ireland have a growing edge over ‘small islands’ in providing 
these services, due to both their preferential access to the largest financial markets, and the 
erosion of the latter’s competitiveness by international regulatory extraterritoriality and 
reputational double-standards.  However, where able to avoid reputational stigmatization, ‘small 
islands’ still appear to have advantages in terms of the level of institutional flexibility they can 
offer.  Crucially, from a normative standpoint, their primary advantage for the activities 
examined here—at least in comparison to Delaware—seems to have been their ability to 
facilitate devices such as securitization tax neutrality that were regarded as more or less 
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legitimate in the US in principle, but were sometimes complicated in practice by the overarching 
logic of Federal tax and other codes.  Ultimately, the relationship between these jurisdictions was 
as much cooperative as competitive; in the case of CDOs, for example, the Caymans provided 
issuers with optimal tax and bankruptcy treatment, while Delaware co-issuers and Irish exchange 
listings enhanced the marketability of securities in the US and EU.   
In all, these findings pose a challenge to the most widespread approach to the criticism of 
offshore jurisdictions.  This narrative has emphasized their role in providing services that are 
clearly and unambiguously harmful, insofar as they directly undercut the tax base, financial 
stability, and financial transparency of other states.  Meanwhile, it has consistently attacked the 
idea that offshore jurisdictions can improve the institutional efficiency of the global economy.  
Our analysis suggests that this is a rather dangerous drawing of intellectual battle lines, wherein 
offshore critics run the risk of being outflanked.  Offshore jurisdictions can in principle be 
‘cleaned up’ from the standpoint of specific abusive practices—and indeed appear to be moving 
in this direction—yet at the same time preserve their more fundamental business model as sites 
for flexible institutional innovation.  To the extent that they retool themselves in this manner, 
they may provide a legitimate service to the global economy, wherein they grease the 
institutional operation of markets; however, given that financial instability is an intrinsic product 
of market operation and evolution, this service is in fact a source of potentially acute danger.   
 This in no way undercuts the arguments in favor of reforms targeting overtly abusive 
forms of regulatory, tax and other forms of inter-jurisdictional arbitrage—both ‘offshore’ and 
onshore.  Furthermore, given the complexity and scope of the international governance failures 
that led to the crisis, it is certain that other more direct contributions of offshore jurisdictions can 
be found, that fall outside of our analytical scope.
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  Rather, what our findings underscore is the 
need for an additional layer of offshore reform analysis on top of the traditional emphasis on 
directly harmful effects.  It is unwise to expect financial stability to be a byproduct of laws (e.g. 
tax codes) that were not designed with this objective in mind; rather, there needs to be a 
deliberately laid-out connection between policy ends and means.  Such a paradigm of policy 
analysis needs to start from the recognition that all actually-existing economic institutional 
frameworks are imperfect, and can potentially be improved by various forms of innovation and 
streamlining.  Next, it needs to explicitly problematize which forms of ‘inefficiency’ act as 
unintentionally beneficial impediments to the endogenous crisis-generating tendencies of 
markets.  Once identified, such accidental impediments can, in theory, be in-turn be repackaged 
as rationalized and targeted policies.   
The proposal of specific policies that would ‘throw sand in the wheels’ of financial 
innovation in a generalized manner is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, they could take 
the form of waiting periods on entity creation and or securities issuance (similar to the issuer 
                                                          
111
Perhaps the most likely, given the structure of Basel, is lax host state liquidity supervision of on-balance sheet 
bank activities—see example in Shaxson (n 7) 188.  Notably, Basel III has addressed this by introducing a 
consolidated bank Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) similar to that used for capitalization.   
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‘minimum duration’ requirements imposed by some countries112).  Another possibility is the 
additional taxation of complex intermediation structures involving large numbers of entities and 
transactions, in contrast to the current (Basel III) approach to increasing capital charges based on 
the size and complexity of financial firms.  This existing approach is largely based on a narrow 
understanding of the emergence of moral hazard from too-big-to-fail-status, which fails to grasp 
the chimerical nature of the whole concept of ‘market disciplining’ of financial actor behavior.113 
Such ‘Minskian Tobin Taxes’ would need to have a sufficiently extraterritorial design to 
prevent offshore circumvention.  However, this does not appear to be an insurmountable 
problem, given the existing tendency towards national extraterritoriality and international 
coordination in financial regulation and taxation.  A more fundamental issue, given the 
‘incompleteness’ of any regulatory framework, is the potential for offshore jurisdictions 
(including US states) to continue to facilitate the opening of new dimensions of institutional 
innovation that fall outside of the scope of these frameworks.  Given that offshore jurisdictions 
can, almost by definition, modify their legal and regulatory frameworks more rapidly than 
onshore ones, it is not entirely clear how this problem can be dealt with.   
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112
 See Deacon (n 20) 45. 
113
 As noted by Katharina Pistor, in ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’ (2013) Columbia Law School Public Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper Group, Paper Number 13-348 
<http://www.modernmoneynetwork.org/sites/default/files/biblio/Legal%20Theory%20of%20Finance.pdf> accessed 
November 12 2016. ‘…strengthening commitment devices [not to bailout] alone without reducing the system’s 
structural vulnerability to crises can prove counterproductive.’ 
